CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/190
8 June 1967
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Letter dated 7 June 1967 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

A letter dated 17 May 1967 and addressed to the representative of the USSR as co-Chairman of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has been received from the Secretary General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Mr. André de Blonay, together with an appeal by the Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in support of the conclusion of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

I request you to arrange for the aforesaid appeal to be circulated by the Secretariat of the Committee as an official document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

(signed) A. ROSHCHIN
Representative of the USSR in the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

GE.67-10309

67-14543

UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

Place du Petit-Saconnex
1211 Genève 19 Suisse

Geneva, 17 May 1967

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to bring to your attention an appeal which the Inter-Parliamentary Council adopted, at its hundredth session, held in Palma de Mallorca on April 1 and 2, for the early conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Representatives of fifty-five Parliaments from all parts of the world were present on this occasion.

It is hoped that it will be possible for you to arrange to have the text of the Council Decision brought directly to the notice of all Members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

André DE BLONAY
Secretary General

APPEAL IN SUPPORT OF THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Inter-Parliamentary Council,

Referring to point 3 of the resolution on "Methods of strengthening Regional Security in Conformity with the United Nations Charter", which was adopted unanimously by the 55th Inter-Parliamentary Conference in Teheran,

Recalling UN General Assembly Resolution 2028/XX, of November 19, 1965, Resolution 2149/XXI, of November 4, 1966, and Resolution 2153/XXI, of November 17, 1966, concerning the conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Considering that the absence of an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons incurs the risk of an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons and in stocks of nuclear weapons, as well as their proliferation, and, consequently, is the source of an aggravation of international tension, constitutes a threat to world peace and increases the danger of a nuclear war,

Recalling the duty of Parliaments and Governments of all States to contribute towards the creation of favourable conditions for the conclusion of disarmament agreements,

Convinced that an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be a step forward in strengthening security and peace, and achieving general and particularly nuclear disarmament,

Urgently appeals to all Parliaments and Governments :

1. to use their influence and take the necessary measures to facilitate and accelerate the conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons which would be acceptable to all States;
2. to refrain, until the conclusion of such a treaty, from any action liable to render its conclusion more difficult or which could lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world;
3. to use their influence towards achieving general and particularly nuclear disarmament.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/191
19 July 1967
Original: ENGLISH

SWEDEN

MEMORANDUM

on the control of an underground test ban treaty.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this document is to provide a more detailed explanation of the scientific background to some of the statements on the problems of underground test ban control, made by the Representative of Sweden in the ENDC on June 29, 1967 (ENDC/PV.309). To make it more generally accessible, descriptive language has been used. To be fully understandable some of the points would, however, require an explanation in mathematical terms.

As stated in the speech, the Swedish investigations have been concentrated on the question of how to use seismological methods of identification to distinguish underground explosions among earthquakes for the purpose of verifying an underground test ban treaty.

2. Analytical method used

The statistical method of evaluation employed constitutes an application of decision theory and is a further development of the method described in a report from the National Defence Research Institute in Stockholm[1/]. It has been used to evaluate both the case of control with inspection and the case of such control without inspection.

The basic assumption made was that a convincing control system would have to satisfy two political requirements:

(1) It should provide sufficient deterrence against violations by making the probability for discovery sufficiently high;

(2) It should contain adequate assurance against the risk that "freaks of nature", in the form of earthquakes similar in appearance to explosions, should induce unwarranted political accusations.

1/ Approaches to some test ban control problems, National Defence Research Institute, Stockholm Report C 4286 - 20(23) 1967

GE.67-13597

67-18015

These political requirements were put into mathematical form together with the statistical properties of the identification method investigated. The quantities obtained were then used in a mathematical model of control procedures which takes into account the always present risks of mistaking explosions for earthquakes and vice versa. (The appearance now and then of explosions looking like earthquakes is covered in this way). This model then provides a procedure by which to determine the level of earthquake similarity below which an event is regarded as an explosion. This level is selected in such a way as to provide the required deterrence against violations and at the same time providing sufficient assurance against mistakes concerning earthquakes. An essential feature of the method employed is that it also permits the determination of the most efficient level of earthquake-similarity, efficient in the sense that the required deterrent is maintained at the same time as - in the non-inspection case - the risk for mistakes concerning earthquakes is made as small as possible. Likewise, in the inspection case, the number of inspections required is minimized.

In conclusion, the method employed provides a procedure to determine whether a particular identification method, exploited in the most efficient way, meets a particular political control requirement or not.

3. Specific assumptions

The method involves eight basic quantities. These are described more fully in the following. In order to be able to make the calculations, specific numerical values have been assigned to some of them. This is also explained below.

For three of the eight quantities the numerical values are determined by nature and by the observational techniques available.

For the purpose of calculation, the number of earthquakes per year in the area to be monitored was taken as 200. According to an official statement in the United States[2] this corresponds to the yearly number of shallow earthquakes in the Soviet Union, of magnitudes larger than 4. This number has also been said to be not far from the corresponding number of earthquakes in the United States. The particular magnitude level of 4 was selected as being close to the level of routine detection by the powerful seismological LASA station in Montana. Events of magnitudes just above this detection level will, because of the sophisticated post detection processing possible with data from this station, have a signal to noise ratio which is helpful to identification analysis also of these weak events. The magnitude corresponds to underground explosions in hard rock of nuclear devices with yields of approximately one kiloton.

Two statistical quantities were employed to describe the particular identification methods considered. One of them is determined by the physical properties of earthquakes and the other by the corresponding properties of explosions. Both are influenced by the particular method of measurement employed. In all, five identification methods were studied. The statistical properties of these various methods were obtained from published reports or from articles in scientific journals. Three of them[3] make use of local or regional data, measured within approximately 1000 km from the event. (For the purpose of test ban control such regional data could be obtained through a proper international data exchange.) The two

---

2/ US Congress, Hearings on Developments in Technical Capabilities for Detecting and Identifying Nuclear Weapon Tests, March 1963.

3/ J. Brune, A. Espinosa and J. Oliver
Journal of Geophysical Research, June 1, 1963, p.3501-3513

E. Jebe and D. Willis
Earthquake Notes, September-October 1964, p.28-40

A. Brooker and W. Mitronovas
Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America,
Volume 54, 1964, p.961-971.

other identification methods considered[4/] employ teleseismic data, obtained at distances between 2000 and 10000 km from the event. (These can thus be used over intercontinental distances.)

The remaining five quantities involved in our analysis express the political requirements of the control procedure. Their numerical determination is largely a matter of political and technical judgement and should be considered as a major step in the definition of a control system.

The sufficient deterrence against violations is defined by two quantities: the number of explosions per year in violation of a treaty and a sufficiently high probability of disclosure of such violations. In our calculations the number of these explosions was chosen to be one per year. The disclosure probability level was put at 10 per cent, meaning that a prospective violator would have to face one chance in ten of being disclosed. This level was estimated to be high enough to deter from violations in view of the high political costs involved in a disclosure. As a matter of fact, this figure seems to have been used in similar calculations in the United States. It should not be confused with the higher levels of disclosure desirable in intelligence activities, where one, of course, wants to find out as much as possible.

The second political requirement of the control system, as outlined in the Swedish speech, concerns the adequate assurance against the risk that earthquakes, similar in appearance to explosions, could lead to unwarranted political accusations.

4/ E.J. Kelly
Semiannual Technical Summary report on Seismic Discrimination,
31 December 1966, Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Mass.

P.D. Marshall, E.W. Carpenter, A. Douglas and J.B. Young
Atomic Weapons Research Establishment report No.O-67/66,
Aldermaston, Berks, UK, October 1966.

In the case of control with inspection the process of verification contains two steps. In the first one mistakes concerning earthquakes on the basis of seismological and collateral evidence are of limited importance as the final political decision will be made only after that the second step, that of inspection, has given conclusive evidence of a violation. The case of control with on-site inspection therefore has to take into account the number of such inspections required or permitted. At the outset of our calculations this number was left open as a quantity to be determined by the calculation. In the inspection case the efficiency of inspections also has to be taken into account. This will depend on the inspection procedure provided in the treaty (in past test ban discussions referred to as inspection modalities) and on available techniques for event localization and on-site inspection. This inspection efficiency was taken into account in terms of the probability that inspections of violations will be successful. This probability was put at 50 per cent, being an estimate of what event location capabilities and modalities could provide, taken together.

In the case of control without on-site inspections, the guarantee given by the inspections against mistaking in the final assessment earthquakes for explosions does not exist and has to be replaced by an extremely low probability for making such mistakes. This probability is measured by the expected number of years between such mistakes. In our calculations this number was left open as a quantity to be determined. In assessing the results, we assumed that control systems, where such mistakes are expected to occur only once in a hundred years, are acceptable and that systems with one mistake in ten years are worth being discussed.

4. Results

Using the assumptions described above the calculations showed that some of the identification methods that have been published are of rather limited efficiency. However, data on the British teleseismic or long distance method of identification by complexity, as presented by Kelly in the report referred to in an earlier footnote and obtained with the LASA station in Montana, indicate the

possibility of a control system with no more than one on-site inspection in two years. A similar number of on-site inspections would be sufficient if regional data, proper to the identification method developed in the United States by Booker and Mitronovas and also referred to above, could be obtained, for instance, through an international data exchange. If combined, these two methods should result in a further decrease in the number of on-site inspections required. This constitutes considerable progress if compared with the requirement of several inspections per year stated in the past.

The efficiency of the published identification methods has indeed improved so much during the last years that it has become meaningful to discuss the possibilities for control without inspection. The data on identification by complexity, already referred to, indicate the possibility of an inspection-free control system with the required ten per cent deterrence level and limiting mistakes concerning earthquakes to once in 15 years. This might constitute an acceptable system in itself. It would be further improved if regional data for the Booker and Mitronovas identification method were made available through an international data exchange.

The most promising of the published identification methods is, however, one which makes use of certain simultaneous measurements, from long distances, of long period and short period waves. The value of this method was recognized at an early stage by British scientists and the data on this method, published by Marshall et al. in the British report referred to earlier, indicate the possibility of an inspection-free system operating at a deterrence level of more than 10 per cent and limiting mistakes concerning earthquakes to one in a hundred years. This would be a very impressive system but in this case our estimates rest on rather few observations and one should be cautious in using our conclusions until more data have been made available. To include in its practical application sufficiently low magnitudes this short period/long period method of identification requires that the sensitive short period array stations are combined with arrays of very sensitive long period instruments and powerful computers.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/192
24 August 1967
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

GE.67-16931
67-20960

Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

(International Control)

ARTICLE IV

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE V

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and _____ other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in _____ at _____ this _____ of _____.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/192/Rev.1
18 January 1968
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

GE.68-568
68-02068

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special

fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate to insure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and 40 other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a Conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in _____ at _____ this _____ of _____.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/192
24 August 1967

English
Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

GE.67-16935
67-20963

Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

(International Control)

ARTICLE IV

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE V

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and _____ other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1,1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in _____ at _____ this _____ of _____.

[CD/]ENDC/193/Rev.1

Readex
Fiche

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/193/Rev 1
18 January 1968
Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

GE.68-572
68-02065

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material

whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to cooperate to insure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and 40 other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a Conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in _____ at _____ this _____ of _____.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/194
24 August 1967
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson dated 24 August 1967

"Today at Geneva the United States and the Soviet Union as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee are submitting to the Committee a draft treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

"For more than twenty years, the world has watched with growing fear as nuclear weapons have spread.

"Since 1945, five nations have come into possession of these dreadful weapons. We believe now - as we did then - that even one such nation is too many. But the issue now is not whether some have nuclear weapons while others do not. The issue is whether the nations will agree to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse.

"Today, for the first time, we have within our reach an instrument which permits us to make a choice.

"The submission of a draft treaty brings us to the final and most critical stage of this effort. The draft will be available for consideration by all governments, and for negotiation by the Conference.

"The treaty must reconcile the interests of nations with our interest as a community of human beings on a small planet. The treaty must be responsive to the needs and problems of all the nations of the world - great and small, aligned and non-aligned, nuclear and non-nuclear.

"It must add to the security of all.

"It must encourage the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

"It must provide adequate protection against the corruption of the peaceful atom to its use for weapons of war.

"I am convinced that we are today offering an instrument that will meet these requirements.

"If we now go forward to completion of a worldwide agreement, we will pass on a great gift to those who follow us.

GE.67-16939
67-20966

"We shall demonstrate that - despite all his problems, quarrels, and distractions - man still retains a capacity to design his fate, rather than be engulfed by it.

"Failure to complete our work will be interpreted by our children and grandchildren as a betrayal of conscience, in a world that needs all of its resources and talents to serve life, not death.

"I have given instructions to the United States representative, William C. Foster, which reflect our determination to ensure that a fair and effective treaty is concluded.

"The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament now has before it the opportunity to make a cardinal contribution to man's safety and peace."

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/195
30 August 1967
Original: ENGLISH

SWEDEN

Draft Text of an Article on International Control to be inserted in the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Article III

For the purpose of providing assurance that source or special fissionable material, covered by this article, shall not be diverted to nuclear weapons:

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes

   (a) not to allow source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to be transferred to any other State unless such material and equipment are subject to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and

   (b) to apply the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all such material and equipment, transferred to its territory or territory under its jurisdiction after the entry into force of the Treaty.

2. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes, in addition, to accept the full application of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all nuclear energy activities within its territory or territory under its jurisdiction.

3. Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes, in addition, to co-operate in facilitating the gradual application of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the peaceful nuclear energy activities within its territory or territory under its jurisdiction.

4. For such transfers referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, or such nuclear energy activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this article, as are regulated by bilateral or multilateral arrangements entered into before the date of the original entry into force of this Treaty, the obligations stipulated in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be implemented as soon as practicable, but not later than three years from the date of the original entry into force of the Treaty.

GE.67-17351
67-21832

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/196
19 September 1967
Original: English/Spanish

MEXICO

Working Paper
containing a Summary of the suggested Additions to the Draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, made by the Delegation of Mexico in its Statement at the 331st Meeting of the ENDC dated 19 September 1967

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to this Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those Parties that are in a position to do so, have the duty to contribute, according to their ability, alone or in cooperation with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the production, industries, and other applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States.

ARTICLE IV-A

1. Nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty shall provide adequate means and facilities to make available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

2. Such assistance shall be requested and channeled through appropriate international bodies with adequate representation of non-nuclear weapon States, subject to procedures to be established in a special agreement; it shall be provided on a non-discriminatory basis and shall not be withheld because of extraneous considerations. The charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

GE.67-18921
67-21839

ARTICLE IV-B

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE IV-C

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith, with all speed and perseverance, to arrive at further agreements regarding the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, as well as to reach agreement on a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict and effective international control.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/197
26 September 1967

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Working Paper containing the formulation of certain suggestions for incorporation in the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ARTICLE I

(1) Second line - after the words "any recipient whatsoever" add: "in any form whatsoever".

(2) At the end of article I, add the following new paragraph:

"Each nuclear-weapon State undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that no person, company, enterprise or private, public or semi-public body that is subject to its jurisdiction and is engaged in nuclear activities participates in any act which is prohibited by this article."

ARTICLE II

Insert the following at the end of the last sentence:

"..., and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices".

ARTICLE IV-A:

"Each nuclear-weapon State undertakes not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty which has no nuclear weapons on its territory".

CE.67-19490
67-22949

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/198
10 October 1967

ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Letter dated 10 October 1967 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

The Head of the State delegation of the German Democratic Republic, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the GDR, Mr. Georg Stibi, has delivered to me, as the representative of the USSR in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and co-Chairman of this Committee, a Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and has requested that this Statement be brought to the notice of all States Members of the Committee. The aforesaid Statement sets out the position of the Government of the German Democratic Republic in regard to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the delegation of the USSR in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I request you to arrange for my letter, to which the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic is attached, to be circulated by the Secretariat of the Committee as an official document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

(signed) A. ROSHCHIN
Representative of the USSR in the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

67-23918

Statement[1]
of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to
the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament

The Government of the German Democratic Republic has for years worked for the renunciation by both German states of nuclear weapons. It supports all steps which can prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms. For this reason the Government of the German Democratic Republic welcomes the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the delegation of the USSR to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It views the draft as an appropriate basis for the early conclusion of a treaty excluding the further spreading of nuclear weapons in any form.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic shares the view of almost all states of the world which see in the early conclusion of an effective treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a contribution to reducing the danger of an atomic world war. It also works resolutely for a nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty because it would enhance the security of the peoples of Europe.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic has worked out a constructive programme for the indispensable contribution of both German states to the bringing about of European security. It proposed to the Government of the West German Federal Republic that relations between the two German states be normalized, that the use of force in their mutual relations be renounced by treaty, that arms expenditures be cut by one-half each, that the renunciation by both German states of the possession, control or share in the control over nuclear weapons in any form be agreed upon and that they participate in a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe.

The endeavours of the German Democratic Republic and of many other European states to establish an effective system of security in Europe would benefit from an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons preventing the nuclear arming of the West German Federal Republic.

In this connexion the Government of the German Democratic Republic feels called upon to expound its views on some questions of the contents of such a treaty.

Owing to its lack of sources of natural energy the German Democratic Republic takes a greater interest than some other states in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Precisely for this reason it supports the Soviet draft treaty

---

1/ Translation provided by the USSR delegation.

binding the signatory states to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy and providing for comprehensive international co-operation in this sphere. The participation of all signatory states in the peaceful use of atomic energy on a basis of equality would be reliably ensured under this provision of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Government of the German Democratic Republic therefore sees no discrimination whatever in a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty could check the atomic arms race, counteract the waste of resources for military purposes and thereby release considerable additional scientific and financial potentialities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic resolutely works for an effective control of the peaceful use of atomic energy orientated on the basic objectives of the treaty thus guaranteeing the observance of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It views the control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to which the big majority of UN member states belong as a suitable instrument to assure the adherence to the provisions of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic rejects any attempt to prevent an effective control of the observance of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. A so-called control by EURATOM, a closed monopolistic grouping formed exclusively by members of NATO with considerable influence being exerted by the West German Federal Republic, is incompatible with an effective control of the observance of the provisions of a nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty since it would mean nothing but a self-control by the West German Federal Republic.

The Government of the West German Federal Republic, which maintained for years that international control was an absolute prerequisite for any move towards relaxation and disarmament, today most stubbornly opposes a uniform control of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It becomes clear now that it wants to evade an effective control to keep open - in one way or other - access to nuclear weapons.

The assertion of the West German Federal Government that it "definitively renounced the production of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons already on October 3rd 1954" is intended to disguise the real state of affairs. The then West German Chancellor Adenauer declared in a statement on October 3rd 1954 that the West German Federal Republic only obligated itself not to produce nuclear weapons <u>on its own territory</u>. The West German Federal Republic has, however, by no means renounced

the acquisition of nuclear weapons, their production abroad or their use and the training of the West German army in the handling of nuclear weapons. It has, for example, concluded far-reaching agreements with the Republic of South Africa on the production and testing of atomic weapons on South African territory.

The West German Federal Republic has the prerequisites for its own nuclear arms production. Its opposition to uniform control by the International Atomic Energy Agency can only be interpreted as the intention to keep roads open to the production of nuclear weapons, alone or in co-operation with other states, and to control over nuclear weapons within the framework of regional groupings.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic holds the view that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be concluded for an unlimited period. Only then can such a treaty become fully effective for the noble aim of safeguarding peace, of humanity, international relaxation and security.

In open contradiction to the establishment of an atmosphere of confidence among all states, which is an indispensable prerequisite for taking steps towards effective disarmament, the Government of the West German Federal Republic demands a "time limitation in the treaty" or far-reaching possibilities for revision. Both are suited to encourage aggressive intentions.

The West German Federal Government opposes the cancellation clauses of the draft treaty because they do not permit an arbitrary withdrawal from it. This makes it quite clear that the West German Federal Government aims at keeping open an access to nuclear weapons for a later date.

It is not by chance that the Government of the West German Federal Republic raises every possible objection to a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These objections are designed to cover up the actual reasons for the West German Government's opposition to the conclusions of such a treaty.

The West German Federal Government regards nuclear weapons as suitable instruments for implementing its efforts to revise the status quo. The aggressive sole representation pretension and the striving for a revision of the frontiers in Europe are to be given weight with atomic weapons as "a military potentiality". In this connexion the Government of the German Democratic Republic points to the fact that the Government of the West German Federal Republic persistently refuses to agree on a binding renunciation of the use of force with the German Democratic Republic and to recognize the existing frontiers in Europe.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic has a special interest in the speedy conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons since the maintenance and safeguarding of peace is the highest concern of its foreign policy and because preventing West German atomic armament is a key question for security in Europe and the future of the German nation. It expresses the expectation that the member states of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will be guided by Resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly, according to which a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons may contain no loopholes which could permit a direct or indirect further spreading of nuclear weapons.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic will, for its part, make every effort, in accordance with Resolution 2149 (XXI) of the United Nations General Assembly, to facilitate the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It reaffirms that its proposal for both German states to renounce the possession, control or share in the control over nuclear weapons in any form is valid now as before. At the same time, the Government of the German Democratic Republic is of the opinion that such a renunciation by the German Democratic Republic and the West German Federal Republic could also be achieved by their accession to a world-wide treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the draft treaty submitted by the USSR.

Accession by both German states to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be an important contribution to European security and could have a favourable effect on efforts for effective measures for nuclear and conventional disarmament.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/199
19 October 1967
ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

ROMANIA

Working Paper containing amendments and additions to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

PREAMBLE

1. After the third paragraph, introduce a new paragraph:

"Recognizing that the danger of a nuclear war can be eliminated only by the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and the destruction of all existing stockpiles of such weapons and of the means of their delivery".

2. At the end of the fourth paragraph, add the following provisions:

"... based on the following principles:

(a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;

(b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;

(c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;

(d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;

(e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories".

3. Replace the present fifth preambular paragraph by the following text:

"Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities in accordance with the bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded by them".

4. After the sixth paragraph, insert a new paragraph:

"Affirming the absolute right of all States, whether they possess nuclear weapons or not, to undertake research on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, both now and in the future, on the basis of equality and without any discrimination".

GE.67-21352
67-24786

5. In the ninth paragraph:

Replace the words "declaring their intention" by the words "expressing their determination".

After the words "through appropriate international procedures", add the words: "accepted by all States signatories to the Treaty".

6. In the twelfth preambular paragraph, after the words "in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons", amend the text to read: "the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, and to achieve eventually the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

ARTICLE III A

1. "The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty undertake to adopt specific measures to bring about as soon as possible the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery".

2. "If five years after the entry into force of this Treaty such measures have not been adopted, the Parties shall consider the situation created and decide on the measures to be taken".

ARTICLE III B

"Nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty solemnly undertake never in any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons".

ARTICLE IV

After the words "use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes", add the words "on a basis of equality".

ARTICLE V

Delete the second sentence of paragraph 2 and replace it by the following text:

"The amendment shall enter into force, for every Party having deposited its instruments of ratification thereof, upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

2. After paragraph 3, insert a new paragraph:

Such conferences shall be convened thereafter periodically every five years, to review the manner in which the obligations assumed by all Parties to this Treaty are carried out.

ARTICLE VII

Delete the last sentence of this article, beginning with the words "Such notice shall include ...".

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/200
24 October 1967

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

I T A L Y

Amendment to article VII of the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ARTICLE VII

1. This treaty shall have a duration of X years and shall be renewed automatically for any party which shall not have given, six months before the date of expiry of the treaty, notice of its intention to withdraw from the treaty.

GE.67-21778
67-25511

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/200/Rev.1
26 October 1967
ENGLISH
Original: English/French

I T A L Y

Amendment to article VII of the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ARTICLE VII

1. This treaty shall have a duration of X years and shall be renewed automatically for any party which shall not have given, six months before the date of expiry of the treaty, notice of its intention to cease to be party to the treaty.

GE.67-22075
67-25866

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/201
31 October 1967
Original: ENGLISH

BRAZIL

Amendments to the Draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. Article I shall be amended to read as follows:

"Article I. Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or control over such weapons directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over such weapons. Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes the obligation to channel, through a special United Nations fund, for the benefit of the economic development of developing countries, in particular for their scientific and technological progress, a substantial part of the resources freed by the measures of nuclear disarmament."

2. Article II shall be amended to read as follows:

"Article II. Each non nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or the control over such weapons directly or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture, acquisition or control of nuclear weapons."

3. A new article, provisionally numbered II-A, shall be included and formulated as follows:

"Article II-A. Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes the obligation to negotiate at the earliest possible date a Treaty for the cessation of nuclear arms race and for the eventual reduction and elimination of their nuclear arsenals and the means of delivery of their nuclear weapons."

4. Article IV shall be amended to read as follows:

"Article IV. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop, alone or in cooperation with other States, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including nuclear explosive devices for civil uses, without discrimination, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in

GE.67-22431
67-25869

the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

5. Paragraph 2 of article V shall be amended to read as follows:

"2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear weapon States Party to this Treaty, and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency."

6. Paragraph 3 of article V shall be amended to read as follows:

"3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty, with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized, in particular the provisions of articles I and II-A."

7. Paragraph 3 of article VI shall be amended to read as follows:

"3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and ____ other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is the one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 1967."

8. A new paragraph to article VI, provisionally numbered paragraph 7, shall be included and formulated as follows:

"7. Nothing in this Treaty affects nor shall be interpreted as affecting, in any way, the rights or obligations of signatory States under regional treaties on the proscription of nuclear weapons or the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties, consistent with the objectives of this Treaty".

9. Article VII shall be amended to read as follows:

"Article VII. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that there have arisen or may arise circumstances related with the subject matter of this Treaty which may affect the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary Governments, three months in advance."